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University of Calgary 
 
When the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper came into power in early 
2006, Arctic Sovereignty had become one of the central policy foci. Not only had it featured 
prominently in the Conservative election campaign but it was also followed up by various 
government announcements and policy initiatives. Thus, it was quickly seen as signifying major 
change reflecting the Conservative project of a “new Canadian government.” This paper will 
critically address in how far Arctic policy has indeed changed. It will argue that Harper’s Arctic 
Sovereignty agenda may be different from his predecessors’ policies but it also shares some 
historical and cultural continuities, and is closely linked to a foreign policy tradition that is non-
partisan, constituting an integral part of Canadian collective identity and national interest. In 
addition, Harper’s own Arctic policy underwent change since 2006. 
 
Depuis son élection en 2006, le gouvernement Harper a placé la souveraineté du Canada en 
Arctique au cœur de son projet national. Cette politique avait été affichée clairement durant la 
campagne électorale des Conservateurs, et elle fut mise en application rapidement après les 
élections. Elle annonçait des changements majeurs et représentait une partie importante du projet 
global que les Conservateurs appelaient « un nouveau gouvernement pour le Canada ». Cet article 
porte un regard critique sur la manière dont la politique arctique du Canada a pu évoluer durant les 
mandats d’Harper depuis 2006, mais également avant son arrivée au pouvoir. On défendra ici la 
thèse que la politique qui vise à établir la souveraineté du Canada sur l’Arctique, que l’on attribue 
au gouvernement Harper, suit et diffère peu en réalité, des politiques développées par des 
gouvernements précédents mais également on montrera qu’elle appartient à une perception 
traditionnelle de la politique étrangère au Canada, non-partisane, qui voit l’Arctique comme une 
partie intégrante de l’identité collective et comme central aux intérêts nationaux. Nous examinerons 
également comment la politique arctique d’Harper a évolué depuis 2006. 
 
“Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over 
the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this 
Government intends to use it. Because Canada’s Arctic is central to our 
national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it 
represents the tremendous potential of our future,” said Prime Minister 
Harper.1  
 
Ever since the Conservative Party under Stephen Harper has come to power in 
2006, the Canadian Arctic has featured more prominently in both the 
government’s policy agenda as well as public discourse. Canadians have been 
                                                
1 Government of Canada (2007), “Prime Minister Stephen Harper Announces New Arctic Offshore 
Patrol Ships,” 9 July 2007, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2007/07/09/prime-minister-stephen-
harper-announces-new-arctic-offshore-patrol-ships#sthash.faBCjYpO.dpuf. 
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exposed to and engaged in discussions on the country’s sovereignty in its 
northern regions and witnessed numerous policy initiatives and trips by the 
Prime Minister to the Arctic that highlighted the heightened interest in the 
region. Admittedly, this new significance of the Arctic might have been more 
rhetorical than real and not always supported by actual funding and projects but 
for many political observers it would become one of the defining characteristics 
of the new Conservative government of Canada. Prime Minister Harper brought 
the Arctic onto the political map in Canada and pursued uniquely Conservative 
policies in the region that would set him apart from his predecessors. These 
policies were defined as unilateral, assertive and at times militaristic. 
 
This paper will examine whether Canada’s Arctic policies under Prime 
Minister Harper have indeed been unique or whether they align with existing 
Canadian (foreign) policy views and practices. It will analyze the link between 
the rhetoric of Canada as “Arctic power”2 while focusing on the interplay 
between domestic development strategies in the region as well as international 
circumpolar politics, especially Canada’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council 
from 2013-2015. Several arguments will be put forward in the course of this 
analysis. Firstly, it will be shown that the discourse on sovereignty is not 
uniquely Conservative but shared by all big Canadian parties and has a long 
historical tradition. Second, within that paradigm, we have, however, witnessed 
different prioritizations of security-related, developmental and environmental 
issues under Prime Minister Harper. Finally, it will be argued that despite the 
fact that there might have been a distinctly Conservative agenda under the 
Harper government in the Arctic, that agenda in itself underwent change. 
Especially over the past two years, one could detect a nuanced shift away from 
traditional national security to more human-focused economic security. If one 
looks closer, though, this economic aspect boils down to a Conservative 
business approach encapsulated in the Canadian push for the creation of the 
Arctic Economic Council. 
 
In order to evaluate the degree of change or continuity in Ottawa’s Arctic 
policy since 2006 it will be useful to take a look at how scholars have assessed 
foreign policy under Prime Minister Harper more generally. Currently, there is 
disagreement over whether the Conservative government has brought 
fundamental change to Canadian foreign policy. Answers vary depending on 
which policy area is investigated, but also on what aspects of policy-making 
                                                
2 Government of Canada (2010), Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising 
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s NORTHERN STRATEGY Abroad, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf. 
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researchers focus on: style, rhetoric, or content. Furthermore, much depends on 
what exactly the Harper government is compared to: the preceding Liberal 
government under Prime Minister Paul Martin or more generally Liberal and 
Conservative traditions in Canadian politics. In addition, while it seems that 
ideological convictions, particularly neoconservatism (MASSIE and ROUSSEL 
2013) but also social conservatism (STARING 2013: 45), played a role in how 
the Harper government framed issues it is also evident that realpolitik and 
pragmatic approaches to political challenges occurred. Finally, because of 
inconsistent and incoherent policies in some extremely important issue areas 
such as Afghanistan (NOSSAL 2013: 26) as well as the “case-by-case conduct of 
international affairs” (BOUCHER 2013: 67) it is difficult to define what exactly 
constitutes the Conservative foreign policy agenda. This is amplified even 
further by the role that Stephen Harper’s individual leadership played. As 
Gecelovsky points out, “[m]ore than any other prime minister, Harper has 
sought to obtain control over all matters of policy, both its substance and its 
communication” (2013: 110). As a consequence of this “micromanagement” 
(KIRK and MCKENNA 2009: 29, 33), “Harper’s personal faith” (GECELOVSKY 
2013: 110) and Manichean worldview (NOSSAL 2013: 29-30; ROBERTSON 
2011: 76) impacted Canadian government policies more than is usually 
acknowledged (BLACK 2013: 222). 
 
Those authors who observe continuity in Harper’s foreign policy relate it to an 
initial foreign policy “inertia” (BLACK 2013: 217) that was created by the focus 
on domestic issues and the necessity to consolidate power during the minority 
government years (2006-2011), the lack of foreign policy expertise and interest 
within the Conservative party (NOSSAL 2013: 23; NOSSAL and SARSON 2014: 
148) as well as the mistrust of a bureaucracy that had long served a Liberal 
government (BURTON 2015: 46-47). At the same time, calling themselves 
“Canada’s New Government” the Conservatives wanted to pursue a policy that 
was different from their Liberal predecessors (NOSSAL 2013: 30). Those 
authors who see major change in Canada’s foreign policy under Harper focus 
on specific geographical areas such as China (BURTON 2015; NOSSAL and 
SARSON 2014), India (SINGH 2013), Israel, Latin America (KIRK and 
MCKENNA 2009), and Africa (BLACK 2013), or on select issue areas such as 
health (RUFF and CALVERT 2014) or the environment (SMITH 2013). Some go 
as far as detecting a negative transition of Canada’s role in the world from the 
poster child of multilateralism and exemplary global citizen to a “rogue nation” 
(RUFF and CALVERT 2014: 131) that discredited the traditional middle power 
approach (NOSSAL 2013) and instead opted for uni- and bilateralism. 
Underlying this change was also “the idea of a robust Canadian state” (NOSSAL 
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and SARSON 2014: 152). Others still notice internationalism but qualify it as a 
more assertive and bold variant that was driven by inward-looking domestic 
politics and interests (BOUCHER 2013; KIRTON 2012). What all these 
interpretations have in common is the understanding that it is more the 
domestic political level than international developments that drove the 
Conservative foreign policy agenda. 
 
This domestic level was defined by three unique Conservative emphases. First, 
there is an understanding that the state should be generally less involved 
(GECELOVSKY 2013: 114; MASSIE and ROUSSEL 2013: 39). Second, if the state 
does get involved a Conservative government will mainly cater to the “views of 
its core supporters” (SCHMITZ 2014: 226). Thus, the Canadian national interest 
is defined in a limited partisan way (NOSSAL 2013: 22) and a Conservative 
foreign policy agenda is mainly driven by pragmatic considerations and 
focused on issues close to the Conservative heart such as free enterprise. This 
emphasis has led to the prioritization of not only international trade and 
bilateral agreements but also privatized approaches to such traditional issue 
areas as development policy (ROBERTSON 2011: 79). Bringing in business and 
non-state economic actors mirrors this partisan approach further. It also 
explains why Canada under Harper changed its foreign policy towards India 
reviving dormant bilateral relations (SINGH 2013), culminating in a uranium 
supply deal in early 2015.3 Third, for Harper “politics is a moral affair” 
(STARING 2013: 45). As a consequence, government should be pursuing a 
“principled foreign policy” that focuses on what is right (SCHMITZ 2014: 224). 
This “radical” (CHAPNICK 2011-12: 153) and “more unadulterated 
conservatism” (BLACK 2013: 224) is distinct from the Progressive Conservative 
foreign policy under Brian Mulroney and has been criticized by former 
Conservative leaders such as Joe Clark for its “disdain for multilateralism” 
(CLARK 2013: 29).  
 
The combination of partisan-driven politics and normative Manichean 
conviction does not easily fit into the dichotomous categorization of value 
versus interest-driven foreign policies. This difficulty is further aggravated by 
the fact that for some observers the value-driven foreign policy was defined by 
the Liberal project of multilateralism and Lloyd Axworthy’s human security 
agenda. Adam Chapnick makes a very important point here when he argues that 
                                                
3 Steven Chase and Kim Mackrael (2015), “Canada, India Agree to $350-million Uranium Supply 
Deal,” Globe and Mail online, 15 April 2015, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-india-agree-to-major-uranium-supply-
deal/article23967494/. 
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Harper’s policy may have shown continuity with that of his Liberal predecessor 
Martin but it is certainly antithetical to the foreign policy approach of 
Axworthy (CHAPNICK 2011-12: 139, 143).  
 
No matter whether Canadian foreign policy under Harper is best characterized 
by change or continuity when compared to preceding governments, another 
question is whether there has been change during Harper’s reign. While few 
political commentators saw foreign policy as a priority for the incoming 
Conservative government in early 2006 by 2011 the Prime Minister was being 
described as being “preoccupied with external threats.”4 After acquiring a 
majority in the May 2011 federal elections Harper even publicly admitted in an 
interview with Maclean’s that “since coming to office – in fact since becoming 
prime minister – the thing that’s [sic] probably struck me the most in terms of 
my previous expectations – I don’t even know what my expectations were – is 
not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it’s 
become almost everything.”5 However, this realization that foreign policy is 
crucial to a Canadian government did not lead to the formulation of an over-
arching international agenda nor publication of a foreign policy white paper 
(BOUCHER 2013: 61; SCHMITZ 2014: 224). Still, some foreign policy issue 
areas underwent fundamental change. A prime example is Harper’s China 
policy which experienced “dramatic reversal” from “the simplistic and overly 
ideological approach that the Conservatives brought with them to office in 
2006” to one that aligned with previous government approaches by 2011 and 
returned to increased engagement with China (NOSSAL and SARSON 2014: 
157). As will be argued below another example is Arctic policy. 
 
A final question remains: if multilateralism has not been the first choice of the 
Harper government what has replaced it? On the one hand, bilateral trade 
agreements have been on the rise. On the other hand we also saw a slight 
increase in unilateral practices. In their study of Canada’s position on six 
international crises from 2004 to 2011 Paquin and Beauregard found Canada to 
be an “improbable unilateral state” that rarely “adopt[ed] a position alone.” At 
the same time they also observed “a noticeable increase in this behaviour under 
Prime Minister Harper” (PAQUIN and BEAUREGARD 2013: 630-631). While 
unilateralism may have been rare overall, its currency changed from the Liberal 
to the Conservative government. In addition, Paquin and Beauregard only 
studied six international crises that were all happening far away from Canada, 
                                                
4 Paul Wells (2011), “Why Harper Wants to Take on the World,” Maclean’s, 15 July 2011. 
5 Kenneth Whyte (2011), “In Conversation: Stephen Harper,” Maclean’s, 5 July 2011. 
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four in the Middle East and two in Eastern Europe. They did not even include 
the Arctic, which, while not constituting a crisis, serves as a good example for 
Harper’s unilateral approach to foreign policy. 
 
Harper’s Arctic Policy 
 
How does Arctic policy fit into the overall discussion on Canada’s foreign 
policy under Harper? First of all, despite the fact that some Canadian foreign 
policy analyses have pointed towards the Arctic as one of the defining 
components of a “Harper Doctrine,”6 not too many of the studies focus in any 
detail or include well-informed perspectives on the Arctic. Part of the reason 
may be the rather unique nature of Arctic policy in a foreign policy debate. 
First of all, it is not clearly delineated as foreign or domestic policy but brings 
together different spatialities as well as functionalities. Because the Arctic 
includes both mainland and Arctic offshore territory, that harbours many 
natural riches but also neighbours other states with which Canada has some 
maritime delimitation issues, Arctic policy as a policy area entails foreign, 
environmental, Northern development, and economic issues, and involves 
many players within the federal bureaucracy. Secondly, Arctic foreign policy is 
much closer to home than many other issue areas that scholars have used as 
case studies to show Canada’s multilateralism or alignment along transatlantic 
ties (PAQUIN and BEAUREGARD 2013). Thirdly, the general narrative of Arctic 
policy has been shared by most Canadians and cannot easily be dissected along 
partisan lines. Even though foreign policy attitudes might differentiate 
Conservative voters from others the correlation between “internationalism and 
militarism attitudes” and supporters of Harper (GRAVELLE et al. 2014: 125-126) 
might not be as clear when it comes to Arctic foreign policy. The reason for 
that is the social construction of the Arctic as an integral part of Canadian 
identity. It is a narrative that has emerged historically and which underpins any 
framing that the Conservative government may actively pursue for political or 
ideological reasons. 
 
After Great Britain had transferred the Arctic islands to Canada in 1880 foreign 
governments as well as American whale hunters posed a threat to Canada’s 
sovereignty in the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Politicians like Senator Pascale Poirier, who proposed a Canadian Arctic sector 
in 1907, and explorers such as Vilhjalmur Steffanson, whose many Arctic trips 
                                                
6 John Ibbitson (2011), “The Harper Doctrine: Conservative Foreign Policy in Black and White,” 
Globe and Mail online, 12 June 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-
notebook/the-harper-doctrine-conservative-foreign-policy-in-black-and-white/article615115/. 
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in the early 20th century received public attention in Canada, as well as a 
number of Canadian artists, amongst them the Group of Seven, all helped 
establish a national image and narrative of Canada as a Northern nation (GRACE 
2001). When international events such as WWII and the Cold War necessitated 
cooperation between the U.S. and Canada in the Arctic, the sovereignty 
narrative served as a way to uphold a national Canadian identity against closer 
North American security cooperation (DOLATA-KREUTZKAMP 2010). This 
security-sovereignty dichotomy explains why Canada is the only Arctic state 
that places so much emphasis on sovereignty until today. It also explains the 
historical apprehensions that Canadians had about their neighbours’ intentions 
in the Arctic. When in 1969 the U.S. oil company Humble Oil sent a ship from 
Alaska through the Northwest Passage without asking the Canadian 
government for permission this caused a public outcry. Canadians were equally 
outraged when the U.S. coast guard ship Polar Sea shipped through the 
Northwest Passage in 1985.  
 
There is another main reason why Arctic policy should not be simply subsumed 
under foreign policy and that is that it is not consistent with some of the 
findings of the above-mentioned investigations of Canada’s foreign policy 
under Harper. While the 2006 Conservative election platform might have 
represented a “tabula rasa” (NOSSAL 2013: 25) it seemed quite developed on 
the question of Arctic sovereignty, which became a core issue of that platform 
(LACKENBAUER and HUEBERT 2014: 323). Another thesis that does not sit well 
with the Arctic case is Massie and Roussel’s argument that Harper’s approach 
to foreign engagement is partly characterised by neocontinentalism (MASSIE 
and ROUSSEL 2013: 41-48). Close security and defence relations with the 
United States led Canadian decision-makers to see “the US [not] as a threat to 
Canadian sovereignty” but “as a benevolent hegemon” (MASSIE and ROUSSEL 
2013: 48). During the 2006 election campaign Harper did indeed promise better 
relations with the United States but shortly after having assumed power he 
disagreed publicly with the US ambassador with respect to the Northwest 
Passage (NOSSAL 2007: 27). In fact, for most Canadians the most imminent 
threat to Canadian sovereignty in the high North is posed by its ally to the 
South and not by Russia from across the North Pole. After all, it was a U.S. oil 
company that sent a tanker through the Northwest Passage in 1969 without 
official authorization from Ottawa and the U.S. coast guard ship Polar Sea that 
traversed the passage again in 1985. And it was Conservative prime minister 
Diefenbaker and Mulroney who portrayed themselves as defenders of Canada’s 
high North. Finally, the public support for a more assertive Artic policy along 
the lines of Harper’s rhetoric stands in direct opposition to the findings of Paris’ 
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study of various opinion polls that showed that the Canadian public did not 
follow the Conservative redefinition of Canada’s role in the world (PARIS 
2014). Here is an issue area where the Canadian public is in fact closely aligned 
to the Conservative foreign policy narrative. 
 
A New Conservative Arctic Policy? 
 
Already in December 2005, while still campaigning for the federal election, 
Stephen Harper announced an Arctic Sovereignty policy in case the 
Conservatives would win. He criticized the Liberal government for not 
addressing this “crucial issue of national sovereignty” and warned that it was 
“time to act.” He promised that a “Conservative government [would] make the 
military investments needed” outlining a plan that aimed at increasing military 
presence in the Arctic and included ship monitoring systems, icebreakers, deep-
water harbours, search-and-rescue and surveillance aircrafts, military training 
centres and support for the Canadian Rangers.7 These were all part of the 
Conservative “Canada First “ defence strategy. The emphasis on hard security 
led many analysts to describe Harper’s Artic policy as one driven by “an 
aggressive assertion of Canadian strength” (CHAPNICK 2011-12: 153) through 
militarization and securitization based on a “vision of Canada as a valiant 
fighter” (PARIS 2014: 275) or in Harper’s own words “courageous warrior.”8 
 
As a consequence, for a number of authors Arctic policy constitutes one of the 
areas that clearly show the changes that a Conservative government introduced 
(GENEST and LASSERRE 2015; MANICOM 2013: 66; ROBERTSON 2011: 78). 
There has been a clear shift from Liberal Prime Minister Martin to 
Conservative Prime Minister Harper in that the latter “more than others, has 
made the Arctic a key national/foreign policy priority” (CHARRON, PLOUFFE 
and ROUSSEL 2012: 45-46). This points towards an important caveat. The 
changes that came with the Conservatives were not necessarily paradigmatic 
but one of degree. The theme of Arctic sovereignty was merely used in an 
“inflationary” manner by the Conservative government (GENEST and LASSERRE 
2015: 64). Such an interpretation would also reconcile the fact that in 2006 the 
Liberals also campaigned with a clear program of building up defence 
capabilities in the Arctic to defend the region (LIBERAL PARTY 2006: 42). The 
new Conservative government only played an already existing “Arctic card” 
(NOSSAL 2007: 28, 33) framing Arctic issues in a specific way for either 
                                                
7Stephen Harper (2005), “Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty,” 22 December 2005, 
http://www.dennisbevington.ca/pdfs/en/2005/dec25-05_speech-harper.pdf. 
8 Whyte (2011), “In Conversation.” 
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electoral gain or in order to garner support for an increased defence budget 
(GENEST and LASSERRE 2015; LACKENBAUER 2011: 4, 6; NOSSAL 2007: 28-
29). This securitization in itself did not represent a radical shift from the 
preceding Liberal government who had already reintroduced annual military 
exercises in the North and used some of the very same rhetoric and discourses 
of Arctic sovereignty that had been around since the 1950s (GENEST and 
LASSERRE 2015: 64, 66). 
 
This hard security posture further manifested itself in the way that Prime 
Minister Martin dealt with the Hans Island issue in the early 2000s (HUEBERT 
2005: 321-327; MANICOM 2013: 65; NOSSAL 2007: 33). Hans Island is a barren 
uninhabited island located between Ellesmere Island and Greenland that both 
Denmark and Canada claim as theirs. The dispute that goes back to the mid-
1980s (HUEBERT 2005: 323) made national news headlines in 2004-2005 when 
in a tit-for-tat fashion Danish and Canadian officials engaged in military 
posturing. However, it was the Conservative Party who seized the moment and 
criticized the Liberal government for its cuts to the military budget and hence 
its inability to defend Hans Island against Danish encroachments. Prime 
Minister Martin had to counteract such allegations and in March 2004, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham announced that Canada would defend its 
sovereignty in the Arctic and that Hans Island was Canadian (HUEBERT 2005: 
326).  
 
Apart from these domestic pressures there were also external developments, 
particularly climate change discussions in the early 2000s, that necessitated a 
response from the Liberal governments of Prime Minister Chrétien and Martin. 
This renewed interest was reflected in two policy documents: the 2000 
Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy and the 2005 International 
Policy Statement. The Northern Dimension was the result of extensive public 
and intra-bureaucracy consultations following a 1997 House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade report entitled 
“Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Co-operation 
into the 21st Century.” It recognized a “new reality of Canada’s North” which 
was not only driven by challenges such as climate change and global interest in 
resource exploration in Canada’s Arctic but also opportunities that emerged 
through the creation of Nunavut in 1999. Security was linked to human and 
environmental security and less to traditional concepts of military security and 
hard power. Recognizing that meeting these combined challenges would need 
efforts on the domestic as well as foreign policy side, it called for a 
comprehensive inter-departmental approach. Throughout the document one 
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finds inclusive and cooperative language especially with respect to a 
circumpolar – as opposed to a national Canadian – political space as well as 
references to indigenous communities that are defined by a government-to-
government approach. One of the recommendations included the creation of a 
Circumpolar Chamber of Commerce. Thus, it proposed to employ diplomacy 
and trade to ensure sustainable development in the Arctic. As we will see below 
the Conservative government under Prime Minister Harper initiated something 
similar with the creation of the Arctic Economic Council in 2014.9 
 
Like the Northern Dimension the 2005 International Policy Statement: A Role 
of Pride and Influence in the World (IPS) acknowledged that climate change 
and the opening of the Arctic made it necessary for the Canadian government 
“to monitor and control events in its sovereign territory” and it singled out the 
Arctic as one of three geographical world areas that needed increased attention 
and action.10 In its “Diplomacy” section the IPS promised to “put renewed 
emphasis on the promotion of our Arctic sovereignty and circumpolar 
cooperation goals.” It essentially reiterated the cooperative and “people-to-
people” approach as well as the developmental and environmental perspectives 
while it also vowed “to enhance [Canada’s] sovereignty.”11 Not surprisingly, 
the “Defence” section linked the protection of sovereignty more directly with 
hard security. While acknowledging that threats were no longer of the 
conventional nature as they were during the Cold War the military was 
assigned an active role in ensuring the “sovereignty and security of [Canada’s] 
territory.” This shows that the Liberal government had already reintroduced the 
link between sovereignty and security with respect to the Arctic, the difference 
was more about the prioritization of the tools of ensuring both. While the 
Liberals generally favoured diplomacy the Conservatives opted for more robust 
defence options (LACKENBAUER 2011: 6). However, this is not to say that the 
Liberals under Martin did not acknowledge that the military would play a role 
in “assert[ing] Canada’s interest in this vital region of the country.” 12 To come 
back to Chapnick’s earlier argument, the Conservatives might have focused on 
the “protection of sovereignty that Axworthy had dismissed as passé” 
                                                
9 Government of Canada (2000), Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy, 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1255/1/The_Northern_Dimension_Canada.pdf, 2, 5-7, 9. 
10 Government of Canada (2005), Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and 
Influence in the World – Overview, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.687242/publication.html, 7, 
30. 
11 Ibid (2005), Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the 
World – Diplomacy, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.687431/publication.html, 4, 8. 
12 Ibid (2005), Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the 
World – Defence, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.687487/publication.html, 17-18. 
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(CHAPNICK 2011-12: 143) but it certainly was not as antithetical to the Liberal 
approach under Martin. Arctic sovereignty in itself did not signify fundamental 
change but the prioritization of Arctic policy within the Conservative foreign 
policy agenda did. 
 
Even though there might have been some overlap with previous Liberal 
governments a closer look at the relevant Conservative policy documents 
reveals two important differences. First, the early policy discussions after the 
Conservatives came to power in 2006 were based on the primacy of hard 
security and defence-related matters. Second, these policies were driven by an 
inward-looking, exclusively defined national interest that was defended in the 
North. The Harper government changed the tone of Arctic politics and policy. 
While earlier Liberal documents such as the Northern Dimension were 
highlighting the interconnectedness and internationality of the circumpolar 
region, the Harper discourse was focussing much more on Canadian national 
interest. In 2000 the Chrétien government reminded Canadians that “[t]he 
Arctic identity that Canada shares with Russia provides a special basis for co-
operation focussing on the North.”13 In contrast, Harper fell back on a separate 
Canadian identity that was Northern but distinct from the “other” Arctic 
nations, especially Russia but also the United States. Admittedly, the Russia of 
the late 1990s was different from the Russia in the new millennium. Still, the 
very outspoken Canadian condemnations of the planting of a Russian titanium 
flag on the floor of the sea at the North Pole by a Russian Duma member in 
2007 and the ensuing “public verbal sparring” (EXNER-PIROT 2012: 201) were 
a far cry from the kind of diplomatic rapprochement that the Liberal 
government under Jean Chrétien had proposed in 2000.  
 
Until 2009, Conservative Arctic policy was characterized by the linkage 
between security and sovereignty as well as the focus on hard power. Most 
official speeches that addressed the Arctic came from the Prime Minister and 
the Department of Defense (GENEST and LASSERRE 2015: 67). The 2008 
Canada First Defence Strategy put emphasis on defending Canada’s territory 
and sovereignty in the Arctic and promised increased defence spending 
explaining that “the Canadian Forces must have the capacity to exercise control 
over and defend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic.” It declared the Artic as 
one of its six core missions, announcing funding of surveillance equipment 
including radars and satellites and renewing earlier announcements that it 
                                                
13 Government of Canada (2000), Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy, 15. 
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would build Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships.14 The prioritization of Arctic 
sovereignty peaked with the Canada First Defence Strategy and the 
Conservative election platform which was entitled “The True North Strong and 
Free,” a line taken from the national anthem in English which does not exist in 
the French version and which had also been used as an entry statement on the 
government’s website (www.gc.ca) together with a range of iconic pictures of 
Canada as a northern country, amongst them a photograph of a polar bear. 
These “innocuous” references allowed the Conservative party to establish a 
pan-Canadian patriotism that was not part of a Liberal tradition but a 
Conservative one and mirrored attempts by the Harper government to realign 
Canadian politics.15 The increased importance of Arctic sovereignty for 
defining the Conservative project may be gauged from the fact that in the very 
first paragraphs of the 2008 platform the Conservatives promised that they were 
“defending [Canada’s] sovereignty over the vast Canadian Arctic.”16  
 
A Changing Conservative Arctic Policy? 
 
The very first explicit Arctic policy document that the Conservative 
government published was the 2009 Canada’s Northern Strategy. In line with 
previous speeches and the Canada First Defence Strategy one of the four 
priority areas was “exercising […] Arctic sovereignty” through “putting more 
boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-
sky.” It reiterated the earlier defence commitments such as new patrol ships, the 
establishment of an army training centre, further support for the Canadian 
Rangers, a deep-water port at Nanisivik and construction of a new polar-class 
icebreaker, which would be named John G. Diefenbaker, after the Conservative 
Prime Minister who not only officially created the Canadian Coast Guard in 
1962 but also pursued a national development policy in the North. The other 
three priorities focused on development, environment and Northerners. The 
inclusion of those non-military objectives provided a first glimpse of a slight 
shift within government views on Arctic policy, away from hard security to 
human development. The document acknowledged that “Canada’s North [was] 
first and foremost about people”. It spelled out a number of initiatives that 
                                                
14 Government of Canada (2008), Canada First Defence Strategy, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about/CFDS-SDCD-eng.pdf, 8, 10, 12, 
18. 
15 Andrew Coyne (2008), “Harper’s Patriot Games,” Maclean’s, 8 September 2008: 22-23. 
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would address health and infrastructure challenges and attract investment in the 
Arctic including the establishment of the Canadian Northern Economic 
Development Agency as well as Geo-Mapping for Energy and Minerals. While 
these were expected to create jobs for Northerners they also aligned with a pro-
business Conservative ideology. Still, the frequent use of the concept of 
stewardship throughout the document as well as the much more conciliatory 
position towards the United States and Russia and the emphasis on cooperation 
highlighted the move away from exclusive hard security discussions and 
instruments. Existing maritime boundary disputes with the US and Denmark 
were now downplayed as “managed disagreements” and the strategy concluded 
with a section on the 2008 Declaration of Ilulissat to show the diplomatic and 
cooperative nature of circumpolar relations.17 
 
What the strategy document did not mention was that the declaration was 
issued at a summit of the five Artic littoral states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, 
Norway, Russia and the United States), a meeting outside the 
intergovernmental Arctic Council and hence without any attendance of 
indigenous groups, who are permanent participants in the Arctic Council. This 
reinforced the Conservative focus on states as the dominant legitimate actors in 
the international realm (SMITH 2013) and may also explain why in early 
October 2006 the Harper government axed the position of Circumpolar 
Ambassador. This position had been created in 1994 and was mainly designed 
to liaise with the Arctic Council once it came into being in 1996. The first two 
ambassadors were Inuit leaders. A year later, in 2007, Canada was one of four 
countries that rejected the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
It seemed like the Conservative government did not accept indigenous agency 
in foreign policy as the preceding Liberal government had. In addition, 
Canada’s Northern Strategy did not go as far as to include environmental 
security. Despite the fact that it mentioned sustainable solutions the 
environmental priority did not include policies to address climate change 
directly. Instead it emphasized the protection of “environmental heritage” and 
focused on conservation through the creation or expansion of national parks 
and wildlife areas in the Arctic.18 
 
Despite these limitations the Northern Strategy already introduced a shift away 
from an exclusive focus on sovereignty to the recognition of the complexity of 
                                                
17 Government of Canada (2009), Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future, http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf, 2-3, 9-10, 13, 16, 33-34. 
18 Ibid., 2, 26-27. 
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Arctic policy and the inclusion of stewardship. This change was further 
consolidated in the 2010 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. 
Subtitled Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy 
Abroad the policy statement affirmed Canada’s status as an “Arctic power” and 
declared sovereignty as the country’s “number one Arctic foreign policy 
priority,” to which it dedicated the first subsection. At the same time, it 
emphasized the “rules-based” character of the region and included further 
subsections on “promoting economic and social development,” “protecting the 
Arctic environment,” and “empowering the peoples of the North.” Recognizing 
the linkages between domestic and foreign agendas as well as the different 
policy instruments the statement suggested both “robust leadership” and 
stewardship roles. While this stewardship role included earlier pledges to 
conservation and national parks it also introduced commitment to “supporting 
international efforts to address climate change.” In addition, it made explicit 
references to the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and 
hailed the 2009 extension of the AWPPA zone from 100 to 200 nautical miles 
as well as the 2010 decision to make the ship reporting system NORDREG 
mandatory as environmental milestones of the Conservative Arctic policy. 
However, it did not mention that all these decisions were taken unilaterally and 
while based on environmental stewardship still elicited criticism from the EU 
and the US (DOLATA 2012: 75-78). Another new angle to existing Conservative 
approaches to the Arctic was the promise that “Canada [would] work to ensure 
that the central role of the Permanent Participants [was] not diminished or 
diluted.”19 Thus, only two years after the Declaration of Ilulissat the 
Conservative government had turned around and refocused on Northerners as 
important actors in Arctic policy. In 2010, the Canadian government also 
reversed its opposition towards the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which was partly drawn up by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and 
promised to officially support it as an “aspirational” document.20  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why the Harper government underwent 
such a change of heart. The 2008 Declaration of Ilulissat caused some criticism 
from indigenous groups who published their own Circumpolar Inuit 
Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic in 2009. Already in 2007, political 
leaders from Canada’s Arctic including Inuit leader Mary Simon, former 
                                                
19 Government of Canada (2010), Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 2-3, 15-18, 22. 
20 Ibid (2010), Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142. 
However, so far the official endorsement has not led to a full legal implementation as the Harper 
government fears this would be incompatible with existing Canadian law.  
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Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, and Joe Handly, Premier of Northwest 
Territories, demanded a focus on Northerners. In addition, US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton openly criticized Canada for not including indigenous 
groups and other members of the Arctic Council when the five Arctic littoral 
states met in Ottawa in March 2010.21 More generally, having been in power 
since 2006 the Conservatives no longer needed Arctic policy in order “to carve 
out a fresh and distinctive Conservative political approach” (BURTON 2015: 
48). Once it was clear that Harper stood for a very different approach, the 
Conservative Arctic policy shifted to include the theme of stewardship. In 
addition, Arctic sovereignty became less of an issue for Canadians. Even 
though party platforms included passages on the Arctic, the topic did not play 
any significant role during the 2011 federal election. Arctic policy became less 
of a priority for the Prime Minister and was left more often to the respective 
departments, such as Defence, Aboriginal and Northern Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs (GENEST and LASSERRE 2015: 67). Overall, Canada moved away from a 
more assertive phase that lasted from 2006 until 2008/2009 and in which hard 
security and defence matters trumped any other considerations. After that 
Canada increasingly looked for cooperation with like-minded Arctic littoral 
states and a more comprehensive agenda emerged which also included 
developmental, environmental and diplomatic aspects (GENEST and LASSERRE 
2015: 67; LACKENBAUER 2011: 6; LACKENBAUER & HUEBERT 2014: 326).  
 
With the renewed focus on human development in the Arctic, in August 2012 
Prime Minister Harper appointed then Minister of Health and Conservative MP 
from Nunavut, Leona Aglukkaq, to be the Minister for the Arctic Council 
during Canada’s chairmanship from 2013 until 2015. She was welcomed as the 
first Inuk to chair the Arctic Council, even though one of the lead negotiators in 
the 1996 founding of the Arctic Council and first Ambassador for Circumpolar 
Affairs was Inuit activist Mary Simon. Echoing the new focus on northern 
development and Northerners the government issued an agenda for the Arctic 
Council chairmanship that combined national and international dimensions of 
Canada’s Arctic policy and focused on the theme of “Development for the 
People of the North with a focus on responsible Arctic resource development, 
safe Arctic shipping and sustainable circumpolar communities.”22 In fulfillment 
                                                
21 Mike Blanchfield (2010), “Clinton Rebukes Canada on Arctic Meeting,” Globe and Mail online, 
29 March 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/clinton-rebukes-canada-on-arctic-
meeting/article1210187/. 
22 Government of Canada (n.d.), Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council 
Program during Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15), http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-
arctique/assets/pdfs/Canada_Chairmanship-ENG.pdf. 
Petra DOLATA 
146 Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies, n° 78, 2015 
of this agenda the Harper government facilitated the creation of the Arctic 
Economic Council in 2014. In the original agenda it was called Circumpolar 
Business Forum and while this council may echo the Liberal idea of a 
Circumpolar Chamber of Commerce it fits very neatly into a uniquely 
Conservative agenda since it prioritized resource development as a way to 
improve the lives of Northerners. While the government may provide support 
for such resource development via geo-mapping activities, the emphasis lies on 
individual and private initiative. This agenda has been criticized as too inward-
looking and uniquely Canadian. In addition, it seemed to focus on Nunavut as 
the most important region of the Canadian Arctic to the detriment of 
Northerners in the other two territories and northern Québec. In terms of 
policies that the Arctic Council dealt with before and during the Canadian 
chairmanship, it was the United States that was instrumental in pushing for a 
reduction in black carbon (CHARRON, PLOUFFE and ROUSSEL 2012: 45). 
Canada was more active in implementing the Arctic Council search and rescue 
agreement hosting exercises in 2011 and a high-level forum in 2012 which 
brought “together northern chiefs of defence to discuss Arctic security issues” 
(EXNER-PIROT 2012: 202). One could argue then, that Canada was still more 
interested in hard power and traditional security issues. And in those cases 
where it included soft issues such as economic development, they aligned with 
a Conservative economic ideology. 
 
Continuities: Arctic Policy and Canadian Identity? 
 
As the above discussion reveals, there have been both changes and continuity 
under Prime Minister Harper. In this section I will focus more systematically on 
the nature of the continuities and uncover non-partisan approaches to the 
Arctic. A look at party platforms shows that there is not much difference when 
it comes to the fundamentals of Canada’s Arctic policy. The 2006, 2008 and 
2011 federal elections have shown that generally the main parties do not differ 
in their acceptance of Arctic sovereignty as part of the national interest. 
Already in 2004 the Conservative Party used Arctic security to criticize the lack 
of military capability. The Liberal Party only mentioned the region when 
promising that contaminated sites in the North would be cleaned up. And while 
the NDP platform included a section on “Protecting Canadian Sovereignty” it 
was addressing independence from the United States in light of the Iraq War 
not Arctic sovereignty.23 That topic only entered the party platforms explicitly 
                                                
23 Conservative Party of Canada (2004), Demanding Better, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2004pc_plt_en._14112008_171920.p
df, 41; Liberal Party of Canada (2004), Moving Canada Forward: The Paul Martin Plan for 
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in 2006. With the exception of the NDP who only spoke about Northern health 
issues, both the Conservatives and Liberals were outspoken about “Arctic 
sovereignty” and both promised programs that would increase defence and 
economic capabilities in the region.24 In 2008 all three parties’ platforms 
contained sections on Arctic sovereignty agreeing on the necessity to defend it. 
They disagreed, however, on the question of resource activities in the North, 
which the Conservatives saw as crucial for economic advancement while the 
Liberals and NDP cautioned against potential environmental damage of such 
activities and demanded improved oil spill response programs.25 Thus, overall 
Arctic policy was not contentious in the 2006 and 2008 elections. By 2011 the 
NDP had dropped any discussion of Arctic sovereignty only mentioning the 
North with regards to infrastructure projects and the Liberal Party campaigned 
with the promise to “halt all new leasing and oil exploration activities in 
Canada’s Arctic waters pending an independent examination of the risks.”26 
 
This was in direct opposition to Conservative government policies. The 
emphasis of the Liberals was clearly on stewardship of the Artic, mainly 
environmental. Another focus was on cooperation and multilateral institutions. 
This might be seen as different from a security and defence-driven 
Conservative agenda, however, as we have seen by 2011 Arctic policy had 
already shifted to include aspects of cooperation with existing frameworks such 
                                                                                                        
Getting Things Done, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2004lib_plt_en._14112008_171941.p
df, 33; New Democratic Party (2004), New Energy: A Positive Choice, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2004ndp_plt_en._14112008_171856.
pdf, 42. 
24 Conservative Party of Canada (2006), Stand Up for Canada, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2006pc_plt_en._14112008_165519.p
df, 18, 19, 45; Liberal Party of Canada (2006), Securing Canada’s Success, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2006lib_plt_en._14112008_165437.p
df, 42; New Democratic Party (2006), Getting Results for People, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2006ndp_plt_en._14112008_165642.
pdf, 21. 
25 Conservative Party of Canada (2008), The True North Strong and Free, 20, 24; Liberal Party of 
Canada (2008), Richer, Fairer, Greener: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2008lib_plt_en.pdf, 36, 61; New 
Democratic Party (2008), A Prime Minister on Your Family’s Side, for a Change, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2008ndp_plt_eng._14112008_16041
7.pdf, 28, 34. 
26 Liberal Party of Canada (2011), Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2011lib_plt_en_12072011_115050.p
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as UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. At the same time the Liberals like their 
Conservative counterparts accepted that “strengthening Arctic sovereignty” was 
an important objective of Canadian foreign policy and that Canadians “should 
be leaders in the Arctic.” Their contention that “a Liberal government [would] 
focus on the peoples of Canada’s north” is not that much different from 
Harper’s attempts at Arctic leadership and coordinating Arctic policy with 
indigenous groups. What was different was the Liberal call to re-establish the 
position of Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. However, with the 
appointment of Aglukkaq as Minister for the Arctic Council Conservative 
practice was not that different from the Liberal demand.27 
 
The non-partisan nature of Arctic sovereignty is further illustrated with regards 
to the North West Passage, which Canada claims as historic internal waters and 
the US and other countries as an international strait. When Conservative MP 
Daryl Kramps introduced a private member’s bill to Parliament in October 
2009, which called for adding “Canadian” to the Northwest Passage, it received 
overwhelming bipartisan support (MANICOM 2013: 70). Not only was the 
Canadian position on the legal status of the Northwest Passage based on a non-
partisan consensus it had also entered the Canadian mind as something 
historically enshrined. As Andrew Coyne so aptly put it in his September 2008 
Maclean’s article: “Oh, and the fabled Northwest Passage, which global 
warming may soon make navigable? The one Canadians are taught from 
childhood belongs to us? It seems we're about the only ones who think so.”28 
The Canadianness of the passage had been socially constructed long before 
Harper came into power. Arctic sovereignty has always been used to 
distinguish Canadian identity from the US. In this respect, Prime Minister 
Harper is in no way different from his predecessors when standing up against 
the US position on the Northwest Passage. The question is whether this was a 
calculated ploy to show to Canadians that a Conservative government can stand 
up against the United States (MANICOM 2013: 65). Such an interpretation 
would suggest that a Canadian government has a choice not to. Like others I 
would argue that Arctic sovereignty is a social construct that defines Canadian 
national interest and identity. As a consequence, as a Canadian you cannot 
oppose Arctic sovereignty. Arguably then, Arctic foreign policy still belongs 
into the category of “foreign policy attitudes [that] feature cross party 
                                                
27 Liberal Party of Canada (2011), Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada, 74, 79; Conservative 
Party of Canada (2011), Here For Canada, 
https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2011pc_plt_en_12072011_114959.p
df. 
28 Coyne (2008), “Harper’s Patriot Games.” 
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consensus” (GRAVELLE et al. 2014: 111). Already in 2000 the Liberal Northern 
Dimension document recognized that Canadian policy perspectives on the 
region have always been driven by romantic ideas and “vague, symbolic 
visions of the past.”29  
 
This is not to say that Prime Minister Harper has not tried to use the “Arctic 
card” (NOSSAL 2007: 28, 33) and has insisted that the Arctic defines Canadian 
identity. In 2010 after travelling the North he explained “we’re doing it because 
this is about nation building. This is the frontier. This is the place that defines 
our country” (quoted in ROBERTSON 2011: 78). While I do not necessarily 
dispute such a utilitarian interpretation I disagree with the underlying 
assumption of rational actors who actively pursue such framing weighing their 
actions according to some cost-benefit analysis. Rather, I would argue that 
underlying such framing is a social construction of the meaning of the Arctic to 
Canadian identity. Thus, identity does indeed play a major role in 
understanding Canadian Arctic policy under Harper but not in the sense of 
“identity politics”. The story is much more complex and informed by 
historically internalized assumptions about the meaning of the Arctic to Canada 
and Canadianness. As mentioned above, a Canadian government does not have 
the choice to not protect the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic. This is not a 
uniquely Conservative stance; the Conservatives simply happened to be in 
power when external pressures such as climate change brought the region back 
onto the political map, like ships traversing the Northwest Passage had 
reminded Canadians of challenges to their sovereignty in the late 1960s and 
mid-1980s. In the past it was often media attention and public outcry over 
potential violations of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic that drove 
government action and not active government policies. Of course, the 
relationship between government policies and public positions is mutually 
reinforcing. Not surprisingly, in 2011 Canadians ranked Arctic sovereignty as a 
top foreign policy priority.30 
 
Still, one might argue that the Conservatives under Harper found their unique 
way of dealing with Arctic sovereignty as an integral part of Canada’s national 
                                                
29 Government of Canada (2000), Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy, 7. 
30 EKOS Research Associates (2011), Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public 
Opinion Survey, http://gordonfoundation.ca/publication/300, 39. This public opinion survey was 
submitted to the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Canada Centre for Global Security 
Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs. It included nine separate surveys covering the eight 
Arctic Council states and differentiating between Northern (744 respondents) and Southern Canada 
(2,053 respondents). Of Canadian respondents, 55 per cent of Northerners and 53 percent of 
Southerners agreed that the “Arctic should be the most important focus of our foreign policy.” 
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interest, what Lackenbauer and Huebert call “Canadian hypernationalism” 
(2014: 320). As Chapnick has argued, rather than using the Arctic sovereignty 
discourse “to create a sense of national pride” Harper introduced the “rhetoric 
of fear” which was never part of the nation-building process (CHAPNICK 2011-
12: 143). The importance of fear (GENEST and LASSERRE 2015: 65; SMITH 
2013: 212) and delineating an outside “other” – whether the United States or 
Russia (MANICOM 2014: 172) – who potentially challenges Canada’s 
sovereignty allowed the Conservatives to redefine the existing identity narrative 
“rebrand[ing] it as a fighting nation” (STARING 2013: 43). In this narrative a 
sense of Canadianness emerged whenever Canada was challenged: the War of 
1812, the WWI battles at Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele, the Arctic. Besides 
fear, history has become an integral part of the Conservative foreign policy 
narrative (PARIS 2014: 282-284; STARING 2013). References to wars and 
Canada’s role in defending the good in the world not only show the Manichean 
worldview and patriotic function of history but also the defensive construction 
of identity as something that needs defending and is threatened from the outside 
by some sort of “other”. Harper himself and those close to him admit that 
stories are important for Canadian nation-building (PARIS 2014: 283). This 
explains the attention that the discovery of the Erebus, one of the ships that 
disappeared during Sir John Franklin’s last Arctic exploration in 1845-46, 
received in the fall of 2014. Prime Minister Harper rejoiced that “one of 
Canada's greatest mysteries” had been solved. He continued: “This is truly a 
historic moment for Canada. Franklin’s ships are an important part of Canadian 
history given that his expeditions, which took place nearly 200 years ago, laid 
the foundations of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.”31 However, he failed to 
mention that Franklin was a British explorer and that Canada did not receive 
the Arctic islands from Britain until the 1880s. Nor did he thank indigenous 





The question whether the arrival of a new Conservative government in 2006 
also brought significant change in Arctic policy is not an easy one to answer. 
While many observed an increase in securitized rhetoric and unilateral practice 
in the High North it is not clear whether this shift was the result of a unique 
                                                
31 Stephen Harper (2014), “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Announcing the Discovery 
of One of the Ill-fated Franklin Expedition Ships Lost in 1846,” 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/09/statement-prime-minister-canada-announcing-discovery-one-
ill-fated-franklin#sthash.RE138byq.dpuf. 
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Conservative agenda or a response to the increasing global attention. While 
some Arctic policies clearly fit into a Conservative ideology and were the 
product of Harper’s individual preferences they were also based on a bipartisan 
consensus and historical construction of Arctic sovereignty as an integral part 
of Canada’s national interest. This positions the study of Arctic policy outside 
established Canadian foreign analyses as it transcends the interest-value 
dichotomy but also reminds researchers of the importance of constructivist 
approaches to foreign policy analysis. Hence, Arctic policy is not representative 
of Canadian foreign policy more generally. More importantly, while Arctic 
sovereignty might be thoroughly “embedded into the Conservative brand” 
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